Antisocial punishment -punishment of pro-social cooperators -has shown to be detrimental for the efficiency of informal punishment mechanisms in public goods games. The motives behind antisocial punishment acts are not yet well understood. This article shows that inequality aversion predicts antisocial punishment in public goods games with punishment.
Introduction
A large strand of literature in experimental social psychology and experimental economics has demonstrated that informal sanctions can solve social dilemmas. 1 The upshot of this literature is that, when people are able to punish others dependent on their contributions, they do so in a way that free riding is no longer profitable and even selfish subjects find it worthwhile to contribute. The public goods game is then no longer a social dilemma and the groups manages to avoid the tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968) . This is very remarkable, because the punishment of free riders is per construction also plagued by free rider incentives: in the best world I would have others educate the free riders to become contributors and enjoy their contributions without engaging in costly punishment myself.
Recent experimental evidence, however, puts the generality of these results into question. Gächter, Herrmann, and Thöni (2005) began investigating public goods games with punishment in different cultures and found that the punishment option is hardly effective in enhancing cooperation in some of their subject pools. They presented preliminary evidence that the variation in cooperation across their subject pools is connected to the use of the punishment option. Interestingly, the differences are not in the way subjects treat free riders, but in the way they treat cooperative subjects. For punishment targeted to subjects with a weakly higher contribution than the punisher Herrmann, Thöni, and Gächter (2008) coined the term 'antisocial punishment'. 2 They investigate sixteen culturally diverse subject pools and show that there is a clear-cut connection between the prevalence of antisocial punishment and the effectiveness of the punishment option in fostering cooperation. In subject pools where antisocial punishment is frequent subjects do not profit from the punishment option and earn lower profits than without the punishment option.
Given that antisocial punishment is a major obstacle for cooperation it is important to understand the motives behind antisocial punishment. Fehr and Gächter (2000, p. 990 ) devote a footnote to the causes of antisocial 1 See e.g. Yamagishi (1986) , Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner (1992) , Gächter (2000, 2002) .
2 There are different definitions for the punishment of cooperative subjects in the literature. Herrmann et al. (2008) focus on the bilateral comparison of contributions between punisher and punishee. Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2005) investigate motives behind the punishment decision in the prisoners' dilemma and call the punishment of cooperative subjects 'spiteful punishment', indicating that they see the motive to increase payoff differences as a determinant for such punishment acts (see also Noussair, Masclet, Tucker, and Villeval, 2003) . Cinyabuguma, Page, and Putterman (2006) define 'perverse punishment' as punishing a subject who contributes more than the group average. They investigate whether second order punishment, i.e., punishing the punishers, eliminates perverse punishment. Nikiforakis (2008) addresses a similar question in a different design. Further data on antisocial punishment is reported by Anderson and Putterman (2006) , and Herrmann (2009, 2011). punishment. They mention random error, improvement of the relative position (status preferences), and revenge for anticipated or past punishment. Herrmann et al. (2008) provide a more extensive account for the causes of antisocial punishment, adding 'do-gooder derogation' (Monin, 2007) , and a desire to punish non-confomists to the list. In the data they find evidence for the revenge explanation but their experiment is not designed to differentiate between various motives behind antisocial punishment. To date there is no experimental study that systematically explores the causes of antisocial punishment.
This paper brings an additional, maybe surprising reason for antisocial punishment into the discussion. In the next section I use the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) to show that inequality aversion predicts antisocial punishment in many cases. Consider a situation where (i) cooperative players are faced with a free rider and (ii) not all cooperators are willing to punish the free rider. Inequality aversion predicts that those who punish do not only punish the free rider, but also the cooperative players who do not punish. This ensures that the punishing players do not fall behind the players who free ride on their punishment expenditures. For punishment of free riders Fowler, Johnson, and Smirnov (2005) and Dawes, Fowler, Johnson, Mcelreath, and Smirnov (2007) argue that egalitarian motives drive punishment decisions. In section 3 I use data from three experimental studies on public goods games with punishment to investigate whether the same is true for antisocial punishment. The answer is no -the majority of antisocial punishment acts occur in situations which do not meet the conditions for antisocial punishment as explained by inequality aversion.
Theory
On pages 836-843 Fehr and Schmidt (1999) derive equilibria in public goods games with and without punishment. They show that in the game with punishment cooperative equilibria are possible. In these equilibria also selfish players contribute as long as there is a subgroup of sufficiently inequality averse players who are ready to punish deviators. Their characterization of the off-equilibrium path in the game with punishment is, however, incomplete and thus fails to account for antisocial punishment. In the following I show that inequality averse players might not only punish deviant group members, but also players who contributed more than themselves.
The game
There are n 3 players with an endowment of y monetary units. The game consists of two stages. In the first stage players simultaneously contribute g i ∈ [0, y] to a public good. After the contribution decision all players learn all contributions and their stage 1 earnings w i , calculated as
where g is the vector of all contributions and a is the marginal per capita return of the public good with 1 n < a < 1. In the second stage players can punish each other bilaterally by assigning punishment points p ij 0, which reduce the monetary payoff of j by one unit at a cost of c units to the punisher i, and 0 < c < 1. Antisocial punishment occurs when a player i punishes another player j who chose a weakly higher contribution (g j g i ).
Punishment of a player j with a lower contribution (g j < g i ) will be labeled as 'free rider punishment', irrespective of the absolute level of g j . The final monetary payoff for player i is
with P being an n × n matrix with zeros on the main diagonal (masochistic punishment is usually not allowed in these experiments). Players have FehrSchmidt utility functions
where every unit of payoff difference in bilateral payoff comparisons reduces utility by α i n−1 in case the other player earns more and β i n−1 in case the other player earns less than player i. Fehr and Schmidt put restrictions on the preferences parameters: both kinds of inequality hurt or are neutral (α i , β i 0), having less than others hurts weakly more than having more (α i β i ), and having more than others must not hurt so badly that an individual would want to burn his own money (β i < 1). Fehr and Schmidt (1999, p. 841) show that, if sufficiently many players are inequality averse, subgame perfect equilibria with non-minimal contributions g i = g ∈ (0, y] ∀ i exist. In these equilibria also selfish players contribute g, because the inequality averse players can credibly threaten with punishment. In equilibrium no punishment occurs. To explain any kind of punishment, we need to assume that at least one player deviated from the equilibrium strategy and chose g i < g. In the following we restrict our attention to the subgame where p ij is chosen; I refer to this subgame as the 'punishment subgame'. 3 I present three simple numerical examples to illustrate how players with Fehr-Schmidt preferences punish other players. A general solution of the punishment subgame is provided in the Appendix.
No punish. Table 1 : Antisocial punishment in a three player public goods game with punishment. Bold numbers indicate utilities or punishment acts of player E, the enforcer.
The first two examples focus on a situation in which only one player is willing to punish other players.
The lone enforcer
Example 1. Consider the game with {n, y, a, c} = 3, 20,
. Assume the group consists of two players, 1 and 2, with selfish preferences, i.e., {α i , β i } = {0, 0}, i = 1, 2, while the third player E shall be inequality averse with {α E , β E } = {4, .6}, henceforth called the enforcer.
Consider a situation where E and player 1 contributed 20, while player 2 contributed 0. 4 The first part of Table 1 shows the utilities that result from this situation if no punishment is exerted. How should players punish each other? The two selfish players would certainly not punish because punishment is costly and yields no benefit to them. Player E, however, might want to punish because she does not like the fact that player 2 earns more than she does. Her utility without punishment amounts to −20, because she suffers from disadvantageous inequality towards player 2 of 20 monetary units. According to the Fehr-Schmidt utility this difference is weighted by α E 2 and subtracted from the monetary income. So what relief can E give herself by punishing others? According to Fehr and Schmidt's Proposition 5, E should reduce player 2's income by p E2 = 30 units (see intermediate columns in Table 1 ). This would equalize player 2's and E's monetary income and increase E's utility to −10.
However, this is not the equilibrium of the punishment subgame. In fact, E is not playing best response if she just punishes the deviator (player 2). The last three columns of Table 1 show the optimal punishment strategy. E maximizes her utility if she punishes both other players. She does so in a way to equalize all three monetary payoffs, which allows her to enjoy a utility of zero. Thus, the Fehr-Schmidt utility function does indeed predict antisocial punishment, i.e., punishment of players who are equally or more cooperative than the punisher.
Weakly ineq. averse Strongly ineq. averse Player Table 2 : Optimal punishment for a weakly or strongly inequality averse enforcer in a four player public goods game with punishment.
Example 2. In a next step let us consider a richer example. Table 2 depicts the situation of a public goods game with {n, y, a, c} = 4, 20, To make things interesting I assume that the enforcer chose a contribution of 9, and the other players in the group chose 0, 11, and 20. This produces a set of stage 1 earnings as depicted in the third column of Table 2 . Let us look at two types of enforcers, a 'weakly inequality averse' player with {α E , β E } = {1, .6}, and a 'strongly inequality averse' player with {α E , β E } = {4, .6}. These two types will have different optimal punishment patterns. The three columns in the middle of Table 2 show the optimal punishment strategy of the weakly inequality averse player. Such a player maximizes his utility by punishing the richest among the other players (the free rider). However, punishment is only utility maximizing as long as E's income does not drop below another player's income. Consequently, as soon as player E's income is as low as the next lower income (in this case player 2's income), he does not exert more punishment, despite the fact that player 1 still earns more than he does.
A strongly inequality averse player does not stop here. Her much higher α E means that the income difference towards player 1 still weighs heavily on her well-being. A strongly inequality averse player prefers to further decrease player 1's income. However, in order to avoid falling behind player 2, she punishes both other players with weakly higher incomes. Player E's utility is maximized when the incomes of player 1 and 2 are equal to her own income.
What does this mean for antisocial punishment? The weakly inequality averse player in our example does not engage in antisocial punishment, whereas the strongly inequality averse player does mete out punishment to a player who was more cooperative than herself. This example demonstrates the necessary conditions for antisocial punishment: (i) player E must be sufficiently inequality averse to be willing to punish more than one other player, (ii) there must be a least one player with a strictly higher income than E, and (iii) in the process of punishing the strictly richer player, E's income must undershoot one of the other (weakly poorer) player's incomes.
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No punish. Optimal Table 3 : Optimal punishment in a four player public goods game with punishment with two enforcers.
Teaming up
Example 3. What if more than one player is inequality averse enough to punish other players? Let there be a subgroup of n = 2 homogeneous enforcers 5 and {n, y, a, c} = 4, 20, Table 3 shows the situation of two enforcers with {α E , β E } = {4, .6} facing one cooperative player and one free rider. According to Proposition 5 in Fehr and Schmidt the two enforcers should punish player 2 (the free rider) such that this player's income is equal to their income. However, similar to the case of the lone enforcer, the two enforcers can improve their situation if they also punish player 1. In the example they maximize their utility by equalizing the monetary payoff of all four players. However, unlike in the case of the lone enforcer, only punishing the deviant player is also an equilibrium of the punishment subgame. If E1 punishes only player 2 by 12 units, then E2's best response is to punish only player 2 by 12 units as well and vice versa. However, the equilibrium including antisocial punishment towards the fully contributing non-enforcer is clearly more efficient for the two enforcers.
Conditions for antisocial punishment
The three examples show that antisocial punishment motivated by FehrSchmidt inequality aversion happens only in order to prevent falling behind other players who do not punish. 6 The Appendix provides a general solution to the punishment subgame. A decisive prerequisite is the existence of other players who do not engage in punishment. Thus, the decision whether to engage in antisocial punishment or not depends on players' beliefs about other players' punishment behavior. This dependency on beliefs makes it difficult to identify sufficient conditions for antisocial punishment, as long 5 To keep things simple I assume that all enforcers are homogeneous both in their preferences (equal αE and βE) and in their stage 1 earnings wEi.
6 Note that the ERC model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) is also capable in predicting antisocial punishment, but does so in a rather trivial way. In this model players care about their share of the total pie (and their own income). If they earn to low a share they can increase their share by punishing any other group member, not just the free rider. Consequently, the ERC model has no predictive power whatsoever about the direction of punishment.
as beliefs are not measured.
However, for an empirical test of the predictions it is easy to derive two necessary conditions for the occurrence of antisocial punishment in public goods games with punishment. If antisocial punishment is motivated by Fehr-Schmidt like inequality aversion, then it must hold that: C1: A maximum earner never punishes, i.e., antisocial punishment can only occur if the punisher's stage 1 income is below the maximum stage 1 income in the group.
C2: The only reason for an enforcer to punish a weakly poorer player is to avoid falling behind this player while punishing free riders. Consequently, antisocial punishment can only occur in combination with punishment of a richer player. 7
Proofs are provided in the Appendix. In the next step I confront these two conditions with data on antisocial punishment.
Empirics
In this section I use the data of three studies on public goods games with punishment. First I look at the study by Fehr and Gächter (2002) who report data from 120 subjects playing six rounds of the public goods game with punishment with {n, y, a, c} = {4, 20, 2 5 , 1 3 }. 8 They use a perfect stranger matching protocol, which ensures that, during the six rounds, a subject will not meet another subject in the session more than once. Thus, from a game-theoretic perspective we observe the subjects playing six consecutive one-shot games.
Using this data I investigate whether observed acts of antisocial punishment are in line with the predictions of the Fehr-Schmidt model. The first result addresses C1.
Result 1: Maximum earners punish
Support. According to C1 all antisocial punishment must come from subjects who earn less than the maximum stage 1 income in a group. In Fehr and 7 This holds for symmetric equilibria of the punishment subgame, i.e., equilibria where all enforcers punish the other players equally. Because the enforcers do only care about final payoffs they could freely reallocate punishment points among themselves, as long as the total amount of punishment meted out by each punisher and received by each punishee remains constant. In case the group of enforcers is sufficiently large there can be asymmetric equilibria where some enforcers mete out exclusively antisocial punishment.
8 I use only the data from the sessions with the sequence punishment -no punishment.
Gächter's data top earners punish weakly poorer subjects by 1.60 punishment points on average. 9 Antisocial punishment meted out by top earners is obviously not zero, but is that number small or large? Subjects who are not among the richest in their group mete out .43 punishment points to weakly poorer subjects. 10 Thus, not only do the richest subjects in the experiments by Fehr and Gächter (2002) punish other weakly poorer playersthey do so even stronger than subjects who are not among the richest in the group. This difference is significant by a Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test (z = −2.61, p = 0.009, test based on independent session averages).
Result 2: Subjects frequently mete out only antisocial punishment Support. According to C2 every act of antisocial punishment should be accompanied by punishment of a subject with a lower contribution than the punisher. The upper part of Table 4 classifies all 720 individual punishment vectors. In about 43% of the cases no subject gets punished. In about 42% of the cases only free riders (i.e. subjects with a lower contribution than the punisher) receive punishment. About 15% (105) of the cases involve antisocial punishment. In 75% of these cases antisocial punishment is not accompanied by free rider punishment. Thus, contrary to the theoretical prediction, antisocial punishment is most frequently meted out without accompanying free rider punishment. The evidence presented clearly indicates that the two necessary conditions for antisocial punishment as explained by the Fehr-Schmidt model are very frequently not met for actual acts of antisocial punishment. The analysis could, however, be influenced by the fact that subjects in the experiments by Fehr and Gächter (2002) play six consecutive games. Despite the use of the perfect stranger matching we cannot be sure that the game reflects a true one-shot game. The fact that the authors observe a time trend in average contributions even suggests that the six rounds are not identical. A recent study by Gächter and Herrmann (2009) provides data from true oneshot games with {n, y, a, c} = 3, 20, 1 2 , 1 3 . In a next step I apply the same analysis to this data set. The data contains observations from 265 subjects in four locations in Russia and Switzerland. 11 For the moment I ignore the Fehr and Gächter (2002) fact that motivations for antisocial punishment might differ across subject pools. This point will be addressed below.
The results from the first and second data set are qualitatively very similar. In the data by Gächter and Herrmann (2009) average antisocial punishment meted out by top earners is 2.24 compared to .95 by all other subjects. The difference is significant (z = −3.04, p = 0.002, test based on individual observations). The lower part of Table 4 shows that also in this data set the majority of antisocial punishment acts (72%) is not accompanied by free rider punishment. Herrmann et al. (2008) report data from 16 subject pools from various cultural backgrounds. They observe punishment decisions from experiments with ten times repeated public goods game with punishment and {n, y, a, c} = 4, 20, 2 5 , 1 3 . Their data contains observations from 1,120 subjects in 16 cities around the globe. The 16 subject pools differ markedly in the frequency and strength of antisocial punishment. Thus, even if inequality fails to explain antisocial punishment in the two data sets analyzed so far it is possible that this explanation works well in some of the subject pools observed by Herrmann et al. (2008) . 12 Table 5 shows the two measures discussed above for each of the 16 subject pools separately. The first column shows the average punishment meted out by subjects who are maximum earners in the specific period. This is the number that should be zero according to the prediction. Obviously there is a huge variation in the strength of antisocial punishment. Average punishment differs by more than a factor ten when comparing the extreme cases. The second column shows the average antisocial punishment of subjects who are not among the richest in their group. In 14 out of the 16 subject pools subjects choose more antisocial punishment when they are top earners compared to when there are others in the group with higher stage 1 incomes. The third column in Table 5 shows the fraction of antisocial punishment acts not accompanied by free rider punishment. Everywhere, in at least 50 percent of the cases with antisocial punishment subjects mete out only antisocial punishment. To conclude, despite the huge differences in the level of antisocial punishment across subject pools the pattern of antisocial punishment acts does not differ substantially. In none of the subject pools antisocial punishment seems to be motivated by inequality aversion.
Subject pool heterogeneity

Conclusion
To test whether observed acts of antisocial punishment can be explained by inequality aversion as formalized by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) I derived two conditions: (i) the punishing subject must not be among the richest in the group, and (ii) antisocial punishment requires accompanying acts of free rider punishment. Empirical evidence on antisocial punishment shows that a majority of the punishment acts occur in situations in which these two criteria are not met. Thus, inequality aversion is not a key determinant of antisocial punishment. This paper contributes to the literature on motives behind the punishment acts. Fowler et al. (2005) and Dawes et al. (2007) argue that egalitarian motives drive punishment decisions. This might be the case for free rider punishment but most likely not for antisocial punishment. The results presented here are in line with Falk et al. (2005) , who compare the frequently used punishment technology (c = 1 3 ) to a one-to-one punishment technology (c = 1). In the latter regime no Fehr-Schmidt player would use punishment. However, in their experiments with Prisoners' Dilemma games cooperators punished defectors also in the treatments with c = 1, despite the fact that payoff differences could not be reduced. 13 Defectors' punishment of cooperators was observed if c = 1 3 but vanished in the treatments with the one-to-one punishment, indicating that relative payoff concerns may be an important determinant of antisocial punishment. 14 However, the relative payoff maximization hypothesis has one serious flaw when applied to public goods experiments with four players and one-to-three punishment mechanism (like used e.g. in Gächter, 2002 or Herrmann et al., 2008) : Given these parameters no player can improve her relative position towards the others by punishment. Due to c = 1 3 every unit invested in the punishment of another player j increases the relative position towards j by two units (j loses three, punisher loses one). However, at the same time the relative position towards the other two players decreases by one unit. Thus, if a relative payoff maximizer weighs all bilateral comparison equally, then punishment does not improve the relative position at all. 15 Understanding the determinants of antisocial punishment is crucial, given that the efficiency of sanctioning mechanisms strongly depends on the frequency and strength of antisocial punishment, leading to strikingly different macro results across different cultures (Gächter, Herrmann, & Thöni, 2010) . The contribution of this paper is to show that interdependent preferences as formalized in the Fehr-Schmidt model provides a rationale for antisocial punishment. Interestingly, antisocial punishment as rationalized by FehrSchmidt preferences is kind of a higher order punishment, targeted to players who are unwilling to bear their share of the punishment costs necessary 13 See also Masclet and Villeval (2008) and Egas and Riedl (2008) for data on one-to-one punishment.
14 See also Houser and Xiao (2010) . 15 Such a relative payoff maximizer could be characterized by having a utility function as shown in equation (3) with β < 0. For example, a player with β = −α would always want to punish other players (irrespective of whether they are poorer or richer) if cn < 1 + c and α > c(n−1) 1+c−cn . For the parameters used in Fehr and Gächter (2002) and Herrmann et al. (2008) the first condition holds with equality and requirements for α go to infinity.
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to discipline the free riders (see e.g. Denant-Boemont, Masclet, and Noussair, 2007) . Seen from this angle, antisocial punishment might not be that 'perverse' after all.
The data, however, suggest that other forces must be at work. A likely candidate is revenge. Subjects might engage in antisocial punishment to take revenge for punishment received in past periods or for anticipated punishment in the current period. Herrmann et al. (2008) provide evidence for this, showing that antisocial punishment is stronger when a subject was punished in the previous period. A second likely candidate is that some subjects might simply enjoy to destroy others' property. There is experimental evidence that, in some settings, subjects reduce other subjects' incomes, even if this comes at a cost to themselves (see e.g. Zizzo and Oswald, 2001, Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009 ). For public goods games with punishment under uncertainty Grechenig, Nicklisch, and Thöni (2010) show that, contrary to the expectation, being in doubt about other subjects' actions does not discourage from using the punishment option. Thus, a pure 'appetite for destruction' might account for some of the antisocial punishment acts. This would be compatible with the observation that antisocial punishment is, to a large extent, meted out by subjects with a high payoff. These are the subjects who can afford to spend money on their pleasure to reduce the income of others without falling behind others. An experimental analysis that cleanly separates these causes is yet to be conducted.
Clearly the amount of punishment necessary to bring down the r weakly richer players decreases in n . When is punishment unconstrained? If w E − π r E w r+1 then there is enough 'room' to punish all richer players without undershooting the income of the next poorer player.
Otherwise the enforcers are in the constrained case. Here the enforcers' incomes will touch w r+1 before they could equate all incomes of the r richer players with their own incomes. If this happens the number of weakly richer players increases by one and the optimal punishment for r + 1 comes into action. The enforcers will include further players into the group of punishees until either (i) there is no strictly richer player anymore or (ii) the group of weakly richer players exceedsr. To conclude, punishment expenditures depend on the distribution of the preliminary incomes w which is characterized by r, the number of weakly richer players. Punishment expenditures are (10) In all but the first and last case the enforcers reduce the incomes of richer players such that all r players earn the same income as the enforcers. In doing so the group of weakly richer players might increase up to a maximum ofr. Depending on the provisional income of playerr + 1 the enforcers equalize the incomes of allr players or mete out punishment such that their income is equal to wr +1 . In the latter case the free riders will keep some of their monetary payoff advantage relative to the enforcers (as demonstrated by the case of the weakly inequality averse player in Table 2 ).
To conclude, if none of the players are richer than the enforcers then no one will be punished. If some of the players are richer and others are poorer than the enforcers, then the poorer players are punished if and only if the enforcers become poorer than some of these players due to the punishment of free riders. Consequently, antisocial punishment can only occur in combination with free rider punishment.
